







THE ENHANCED COGNITIVE INTERVIEW, IMAGERY, REPETITION, AND 
DELAY: EFFECTS ON EYEWITNESS ACCURACY 
 
 
A DISSERTATION  
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Degree of 

















THE ENHANCED COGNITIVE INTERVIEW, IMAGERY, REPETITION, AND 
DELAY: EFFECTS ON EYEWITNESS ACCURACY 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 

















































































 Copyright by WILLIAM ANTHONY COKER 2010 






 I would like to thank Dr. Daniel Kimball for the guidance and support that he has 
shown me while pursuing this sometimes seemingly unreachable goal. I would also like 
to thank Renee, my beautiful wife for her love and the physical, mental and psychological 
support that she has given me throughout this process. I would like to thank James Podell 
and Constance Monsour for their tireless efforts collecting and scoring data for the 
experiments in this Dissertation. I also want to acknowledge the hard work of the other 
Undergraduate Research Assistants helping to score the interviews presented in these 
Experiments. I also want to that my fellow Graduate Students in our lab for being a 
sounding board and the other many helpful suggestions that they have made throughout 
this process. Lastly, I want to thank my friends and family for the support that they have 
given me throughout my academic career. 
	  v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TITLE PAGE          i 
SIGNATURE PAGE         ii 
COPYRIGHT PAGE         iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS        iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS        v 
LIST OF TABLES         vi 
LIST OF FIGURES         vii 
ABSTRACT          viii 
CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION       1 
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW      4 
CHAPTER 3 – EXPERIMENT 1       20 
CHAPTER 4 – EXPERIMENT 2       38 
CHAPTER 5 – GENERAL DISCUSSION      52 
REFERENCES         57 
 
	  vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 3.1 – Experiment 1 Demographics      62 
TABLE 3.2 – Mean Recall Rates by Item Type from Experiment 1   63 
TABLE 3.3 – Mean Recall Rates by Item Type and Condition from  
Experiment 1        64 
TABLE 4.1 – Experiment 2 Demographics      65 




LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE 3.1 – Experiment 1 Design and Procedure     67 
FIGURE 3.2 – Overall Accuracy Rates for Experiment 1    68 
FIGURE 3.3 – Overall Accuracy Rates for Repeated Interviews  
from Experiment 1       69 
FIGURE 3.4 – Accuracy Rates by Item Type and Condition  
from Experiment 1       70 
FIGURE 3.5 – Accuracy Rates by Imagery and Item Type for  
Repeated Interviews from Experiment 1    71 
FIGURE 3.6 – Proportion of Items Gained Across Repeated  
Interviews from Experiment 1     72 
FIGURE 3.7 – Proportion of Items Lost Across Repeated  
Interviews from Experiment 1     73 
FIGURE 4.1 – Experiment 2 Design and Procedure     74 
FIGURE 4.2 – Overall Accuracy Rates by Condition from Experiment 2  75 
FIGURE 4.3 – Accuracy Rates by Condition and Item Type  
from Experiment 2       76 
FIGURE 4.4 – Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Rates by  
Lineup Type from Experiment 2     77 
FIGURE 4.5 – Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Rates by  
Interview Condition from Experiment 2    78 
FIGURE 4.6 - Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Rates Based  
on Choosing Propensity from Experiment 2    79 
	  viii 
ABSTRACT 
 In two experiments we examined the usefulness of the enhanced cognitive 
interview (ECI; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) as both a research tool and interview protocol 
for use with victims and witnesses to crimes. The ECI was developed based on a variety 
cognitive theories and conversational techniques that have facilitated memory 
performance in laboratory experiments. Previous research has attempted to validate the 
ECI as an optimal interview technique, but there are limitations to those attempts (e.g., 
M. R. Davis, McMahon, & Greenwood, 2005; Milne & Bull, 2002). The present research 
offers a novel methodology to address these previous limitations. Experiment 1 examined 
the usefulness of the focused imagery component of the ECI and the effects of delay and 
repetition of interviewing on eyewitness accuracy. The results showed that the inclusion 
of focused imagery as part of the ECI significantly improved eyewitness recall accuracy, 
particularly for person details, and this advantage increased when the initial interview 
was delayed for a week compared to immediately after the witnessed event. The results 
also showed no change in eyewitness accuracy between an initial interview conducted 
immediately after the witnessed event and a repetition of the interview a week later. 
Experiment 2 examined the impact of the ECI on eyewitness identification accuracy, as 
little research has been done in this area. Previous research suggests that when 
eyewitnesses generate a sufficient amount of suspect detail, they are less likely to identify 
a suspect in a subsequent lineup. The results of Experiment 2 showed that compared to a 
control interview, there were no significant differences in selection rates with the ECI. 
Experiment 2 also failed to find the same benefits in recall accuracy that were found in 
Experiment 1. Implications and future directions are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
 In her seminal work, Elizabeth Loftus highlighted the challenges that we face as 
cognitive researchers studying eyewitness memory (Loftus, 1979). Loftus showed that 
eyewitness memory is inherently malleable and vulnerable to corruption in a variety of 
circumstances. A recent review has further validated Loftus’s work and highlighted the 
challenges that the legal community continues to face with eyewitness memory (Wells et 
al., 2006). Wells et al. point out that faulty eyewitness memory affects the outcome of 
many legal cases. In fact, since the mid-1990’s around 75% of overturned convictions 
based on DNA evidence involved faulty eyewitness memory.  
 A more recent tool—the Cognitive Interview (CI)—has been developed to 
optimize the collection of information from eyewitnesses (Wells et al., 2000), but it has 
not been widely adopted in the United States (as it has been in other countries). Wells et 
al. (2006) concluded that only about 10% of the population in the United States actually 
benefits from this interview technique. The CI was developed by Geiselman, Fisher and 
colleagues in the mid-to-late 1980’s and has been shown to be much more effective than 
standard police interview tactics traditionally used to interview victims and witnesses 
(Fisher & Geiselman, 1992; Fisher, Geiselman, Raymond, Jurkevich, & Warhaftig, 1987; 
Fisher & Schreiber, 2007; Geiselman et al., 1984; Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & 
Holland, 1985). The CI was revised in 1987 to add new cognitive and non-cognitive 
components, resulting in the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI; Fisher, Geiselman, 
Raymond et al., 1987; Fisher & Geiselman, 1992).  
 The ECI has been used in several studies with several different control conditions 
and has always proven itself to elicit higher and often more accurate recall than those 
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controls (for review, see Fisher & Schreiber, 2007). While the ECI has proven itself to be 
a useful alternative to traditional, closed-ended questioning techniques that law 
enforcement officials use, it has many complex components that have not been fully 
evaluated, either separately or—especially—in the context of the remaining components. 
There have been attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the ECI in promoting 
eyewitness memory, but those attempts have failed to examine the interactive effects of 
particular components (e.g., Boon & Noon, 1994; Milne & Bull, 2002). The goal of the 
present research is to begin to assess how these complex components work together to 
facilitate eyewitness memory.  
 The majority of the research regarding eyewitness memory has focused on 
eyewitness identification accuracy (Wells et al., 2006). This is because false 
identifications have been the cause of many wrongful convictions. However, little 
research has actually examined eyewitness identifications using the ECI. Finger and 
Pezdek (1999) used portions of the ECI to examine their impact on the accuracy of 
suspect descriptions and subsequent identifications. Finger and Pezdek reported that 
when participants return 1-week after their interview, their was a benefit to identification 
accuracy compared to when participants made identifications immediately after their 
interviews. There are limitations to the generality of their findings because they did not 
use the full ECI and they only interviewed participants about suspect descriptions, not the 
entire witnessed event.  
 The current work will more fully explore the cognitive processes underlying the 
ECI and how those processes impact eyewitness identifications. In the following sections 
we will more fully discuss the cognitive processes thought to underlie the ECI 
	  3 
techniques, the eyewitness literature that examines these processes, and two experiments 
designed to examine some of the possible interactive effects of ECI components. The 
results of the experiments will be discussed both in terms of basic cognitive processes 
and practical applications for the legal community. 
	  4 
CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW 
Development of the Cognitive Interview  
Fisher and colleagues developed the CI in the mid 1980’s (e.g., Geiselman et al., 
1985; Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, & Holland, 1986). Since its original inception, the 
CI has been promoted as a superior eyewitness interview tool (for discussion, see Fisher 
& Castano, 2008). The CI has even been suggested as a more appropriate interview tool 
by the United States Department of Justice (Wells et al., 2000). The original CI was 
based on a set of four cognitive mnemonics that were designed to improve both the 
quantity and quality of information (Geiselman et al., 1984). These mnemonic devices 
elicit a higher quantity and quality of information compared to standard police interview 
techniques (Geiselman et al., 1984; Geiselman et al., 1985, 1986), but other questions 
still remain unanswered about this technique. We will elaborate and address those 
questions in following sections.  
The four cognitive mnemonics that comprised the original CI technique were 
based on two key cognitive theories that were established in the literature: 1) the idea that 
there are multiple memory traces that can be activated to access an item in memory 
(Bower, 1967); and, 2) the encoding specificity hypothesis that states that the quality and 
amount of overlap between the encoded and retrieved memory contexts is directly related 
to the probability of recalling items from memory (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). The four 
mnemonics were: i) mental context reinstatement, ii) an instruction to recall everything, 
no matter the presumed importance of the information, iii) reverse retrieval order, and iv) 
a perspective-change instruction.  
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These mnemonics were implemented through the use of several different 
instructions (Geiselman et al., 1984). First, the participants were told to try and “reinstate 
in your mind the context surrounding the incident” (p. 76). Second, participants were 
told, “some people hold back information because they are not quite sure what they 
remember” (p. 76); participants were then encouraged not to edit their memories when 
recalling the event. Third, participants were encouraged to start at the beginning the first 
time they recall the event, but then on subsequent attempts they should try to use different 
recall orders, including starting at the end and working back to the beginning of the 
incident. Fourth and last, participants were encouraged to adopt the perspective of other 
people in the incident.  
Research has shown that these mnemonics in isolation facilitate recall of simple 
stimuli in the laboratory. Smith (1979) showed that participants showed a significantly 
higher recall rate when the context at retrieval was the same as the context during 
encoding, compared to a different retrieval context. In fact, as will be discussed later in 
this section, this is one of the key components of the CI (e.g., Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 
2009). The mental reinstatement of context instruction (see, e.g., Geiselman et al. 1984) 
of the CI has been shown to increase recall output compared to a control condition (e.g., 
Boon & Noon, 1994; Milne & Bull, 2002). These findings are in line with the principle of 
encoding specificity. 
The instruction to recall everything, no matter the perceived importance of the 
information is also an important mnemonic in the CI (e.g., Milne & Bull, 2002). This 
instruction was intended to increase overall memory output (Geiselman et al. 1984). By 
increasing recall output, it could allow more retrieval pathways to be activated, which is 
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in line with a higher probability of recall output of additional items based on the 
mechanisms laid out by Bower (1967). Therefore, the instruction to recall everything 
allows for a cognitive process to become activated that allows for the facilitation of 
recall, which is the goal of the CI.  
The third mnemonic is also beneficial to memory retrieval. The reverse recall 
order instruction in the CI is designed to change the focus of the eyewitness to items that 
they otherwise might not access (Geiselman et al., 1984). Whitten and Leonard (Whitten 
& Leonard, 1981) found that having participants recall autobiographical details in a 
reverse chronological order significantly improved memory performance. Whitten and 
Leonard concluded that by using a reverse-order recall strategy, participants were able to 
focus on aspects of the autobiographical details that they may not normally focus on, 
which lead to retrieval of previously unretrieved items. The process of retrieving these 
unretrieved items would cause the activation of additional memory traces, which would 
increase recall probability based on the mechanisms described by Bower (1967). By 
applying this instruction to the CI, Geiselman et al. (1984) allowed for the probability of 
additional memory access through the activation of additional memory traces, which has 
the potential to further facilitate recall with the CI.  
The fourth mnemonic in the CI is the perspective-change instruction, which has 
underlying mechanisms similar to those of the reverse-order menomonic (Geiselman et 
al., 1984). Pichert and Anderson (1977) had participants read a narrative from the 
perspective of a homebuyer, burglar, or neither (control). The results showed that 
participants were able to recall more information consistent with the perspective that they 
used at encoding. Anderson and Pichert (1978) followed up this study by having 
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participants read narratives from the perspective of either a homebuyer or a burglar and 
then recall the narrative from the same or different perspective of that used at encoding. 
They found that adopting a perspective different from that used at encoding led 
participants to change the type of information on which they focused. This change 
allowed for different details to be recalled relative to those participants had previously 
recalled. Similarly to reverse-order recall, the mechanisms underlying the perspective 
change would increase the number of active memory traces and increase context overlap, 
and that would lead to a higher recall probability based on the cognitive mechanisms that 
Bower (1967) and Tulving and Thomson (1973) described.  
Thus far we have discussed the cognitive mechanisms underlying the CI; now we 
will briefly discuss the implementation of the CI as an interview technique. The CI 
occurs in several phases (Geiselman et al. 1985). During the first phase witnesses are 
given the context-reinstatement and recall-everything instructions and asked to engage in 
free recall of the event in question. After free recall is complete, the interviewer asks 
follow-up questions based on the information provided by the eyewitness. After this 
follow-up questioning phase, interviewers give eyewitnesses the instruction to use the 
reverse-order recall strategy to freely recall the event again. Following this phase is the 
last phase of the CI, the perspective-change phase in which the interviewers give 
eyewitnesses the instruction to use the perspective-change to engage in another free recall 
attempt.  
Though the original CI has been shown to be superior to other interviewing 
techniques, there were still aspects of interviews that this interviewing technique had not 
taken into account (e.g., the social dynamics of an interaction, etc.). In an enhancement of 
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the CI (refered to as the ECI from here on) to address these shortcomings. Fisher and 
colleagues  (Fisher et al., 1987) revised the original CI to include a clearer set of 
guidelines for interviewers using the CI, and to include additional techniques to further 
optimize its effectiveness as an interview tool.  Fisher et al. added instructions to limit 
interviewer’s interruptions during the free narrative portion of the interview, as they 
noted this to be a particular problem hindering typical police interviews. They also added 
instructions to facilitate the organization of follow-up questions so they are more open-
ended and in an order more consistent with the eyewitness’s free recall account of the 
event. They compared the ECI to the original CI and found that there was a significant 
increase in correct recall with the ECI compared to the original CI. They also noted that 
there were no differences in incorrect or confabulated recall between the two. These 
revisions, discussed in detail next, thus further enhanced eyewitness recall performance.  
Fisher and Geiselman (1992) published a set of guidelines on how to properly 
conduct and interview with the ECI. According to Fisher and Geiselman, the ECI 
contains the mnemonic techniques from the CI that facilitate eyewitness recall, with the 
addition of several guidelines on properly conducting an eyewitness interview. First the 
ECI incorporated several interpersonal communication techniques that have been shown 
to aid recall. These techniques include knowing when to establish and relinquish eye 
contact to facilitate the comfort of the eyewitness. Another of the techniques involved 
insuring that the eyewitness is aware that they are in complete control of the interview. 
Interviewers are also strongly encouraged never to interrupt an eyewitness during the 
interview process. These techniques were intended to insure that the eyewitness is 
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comfortable with the interview process and to facilitate social interaction and information 
output (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992).  
Fisher and Geiselman (1992) also provided additional guidelines for interviewers 
on how to formulate follow-up questions. They suggested that interviewers only ask 
questions pertaining to the information that an eyewitness has already recalled during 
earlier parts of the interview. The questions that are asked should begin with open-ended 
questions and proceed to more direct, closed-ended questions. For example, if an 
eyewitness mentions the suspect during the free recall stage of the interview but does not 
provide many additional details, then the interviewer should pose a question such as: 
“you mentioned the perpetrator, could you describe the perpetrator in more detail?” The 
interviewer can then proceed to more direct questions based on what the eyewitness 
recalls in response to the initial question (i.e. “You mentioned they had short hair, can 
you tell me what color it was?”). By following these guidelines Fisher and Geiselman 
suggested that an interviewer will facilitate the output of correct information while 
minimizing the likelihood of incorrect retrieval.  
Fisher and Geiselman (1992) also added an additional mnemonic to the ECI, the 
use of focused imagery. Paivio (1971) postulated that visual and verbal information are 
stored in separate locations in memory. By using a focused imagery instruction during the 
follow-up questioning procedure, the interviewer can have the eyewitness access visual 
traces, which can help facilitate memory retrieval. Fisher and Geiselman (1992) 
contended that it is important to ask questions in a way that facilitates access not only to 
the concept traces, but also to the image traces that are stored in memory. This is done in 
the ECI by asking the eyewitness directly what mental images they remember from the 
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incident and asking questions to probe those images. Fisher and Geiselman also stressed 
the importance of using multiple retrieval attempts to recall information. Multiple 
retrieval attempts have been shown to cause hypermnesia with eyewitnesses (Scrivner & 
Safer, 1988).  
Evaluation of the CI and ECI 
Geiselman et al. (1984) published the original evaluation of the CI in which they 
compared it to a control interview that was comprised of an interview without the aid of 
the four mnemonics that are unique to the CI. Using a staged event in which one 
instructor entered a classroom and took the projector from the lecturing instructor, 
Geiselman et al. had particpants return at a 48hr delay to be interviewed. This initial 
evaluation of the CI showed that the mnemonics aided participants in recalling more 
correct information compared to the control interview. The CI also led to more incorrect 
recall during the follow-up questioning phase. These findings were independently 
replicated in another laboratory to further support the effectiveness of this interview 
(Aschermann, Mantwill, & Kohnken, 1991).  
Geiselman et al. (1984) showed the superiority of the CI, but they failed to control 
for several key factors that could have been important. First, the experimenter did not 
directly interview participants; they were given recall booklets with instructions for each 
portion of the interview. Subsequent experiments with the CI used a more structured 
interview format instead of booklets. A second limitation is that there were only eight 
participants per interview condition, though that was enough power to reach statistical 
significance. The last specific limitation with this study is that the authors examined 
correct and incorrect recall, but they failed to directly examine accuracy. This limitation 
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is particularly troubling because higher incorrect recall rates directly affect eyewitness 
accuracy. Nevertheless, despite these limitations, the study provides evidence that the 
mnemonic devices in the CI do indeed improve recall performance for eyewitnesses. 
Fortunately, other studies have rectified these limitations. 
Geiselman et al. (1985) followed up their original evaluation of the CI and 
furthered the support for the CI as a better interview technique in the laboratory. 
Geiselman et al. showed participants crime videos and conducted the interviews at a 48hr 
delay. As in the original study, in this study Geiselman et al. used the CI and standard 
control condition1 as well as hypnosis, a novel condition. The results showed that the CI 
and the hypnosis conditions performed equally well eliciting correct information and 
there were no differences in output of other types of information. One of the main 
advantages that the CI showed was that the implementation time was vastly superior to 
the hypnosis interviews by almost 20 min. They also argued that it is easier to train 
interviewers to conduct the CI than other interview techniques but this claim must be 
qualified by the fact that they used experienced law enforcement officials to conduct the 
interviews in the study.  
Research has also shown that the CI could help inoculate against the negative 
effects of misinformation if the interview is conducted prior to exposure to the 
misinformation (Geiselman, Fisher, Cohen, & Holland, 1986). Geiselman and Padilla 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The standard control condition or standard police interview as it is often refered to by 
Fisher and collegues (e.g., Fisher and Schreiber, 2007), is difficult to operationalize 
because there are no specific guidelines used to train officers in the United States (Wells 
et al. 2006). Fisher and Schreiber merely state that the standard interview condition 
should be one that is currently in practice, but that will vary across different time periods 
and regions because of the diversity of interview techniques used in the real world (Wells 
et al. 2006). 
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(1988) also extended the original CI to use with child eyewitnesses. They had children 
view a video of a liquor store holdup and interviewed them after a three-day delay with 
either a standard police interview or a CI. Their results showed that children performed 
significantly better when interviewed with the CI than with the standard interview. There 
results further the validity of the CI as an interview tool and extend its use to a wider 
population of individuals. Other researchers have also examined the usefulness of the CI 
with child witnesses (Flin, Boon, Knox, & Bull, 1992). 
Fisher and colleagues have replicated these results several times (Fisher, 
Geiselman, & Amador, 1989; Geiselman, Fisher, Cohen, Holland, & Surtes, 1986; 
Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon et al., 1986), each time showing the CI to be superior to 
other interview techniques (for review, see Geiselman, 1988). In addition to having law 
enforcement officials use the CI to interview participants, Fisher and colleagues have also 
trained police officers to interview real eyewitnesses. Fisher, Geiselman, and Amador 
(1989) trained half of a group of police officers to conduct CIs with eyewitnesses to a real 
crime following the collection of baseline interview recordings. After the training more 
recorded interviews were gathered and blind raters rated all interviews. The results 
showed that when the CI was used in real situations there was a significant improvement 
in the number of details that the officers were able to elicit from eyewitnesses with the CI 
compared to their previous techniques.  
Boon and Noon (1994) made an attempt to validate the CI by isolating each of the 
components of the CI and examining the impact that each had on eyewitness memory. 
There were 5 conditions in their study: 1) recall everything followed by reverse order; 2) 
recall everything followed by change perspective; 3) recall everything followed by 
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context reinstatement; 4) recall everything followed by try again; and 5) no special 
instructions followed by try again. Boon and Noon chose this design because the report 
everything instruction is the part of the CI most often used by eyewitness interviewers, 
even when not using the CI. There was a 48hr delay between the initial encoding of the 
video and the interview. During the interview participants were given instructions based 
on the condition to which they were assigned and were asked to write everything that 
they could remember from the critical video during both recall attempts.  
Boon and Noon (1994) reported no differences in recall performance during the 
initial recall portion of the interview for the groups using the mnemonic components of 
the CI and all were superior to the no instruction control group. There was also 
significant improvement during the second recall session for all mnemonics except the 
change perspective instruction. Their results show that the individual components of the 
CI are superior to no instruction. Boon and Noon reported novel results isolating each of 
the mnemonic strategies of the CI, others have replicated this evaluation method. 
Milne and Bull (2002) also examined the validity of the CI by isolating each 
mnemonic component, but they only looked at the four original mnemonic components 
from the original CI. Milne and Bull did use a rapport building phase that was not part of 
the original CI, but was added to the ECI, but they failed to include other ECI 
components. There were two phases in their interviews, an initial free recall phase 
followed by one of the following six conditions designed to examine each of the 
mnemonics in isolation: 1) recall everything condition, 2) mental reinstatement of context 
condition, 3) reverse-order recall condition, 4) perspective-change condition, 5) recall 
everything + mental reinstatement of context condition, and 6) additional free recall 
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control condition. Their results showed that the combination of the context reinstatement 
and recall everything instructions was superior to all other conditions except the context 
reinstatement instruction alone; the context reinstatement condition did not itself differ 
from the remaining four conditions, which did not differ amongst themselves. They 
concluded that the combination of the mnemonics could be important in enhancing recall 
with the ECI.  
There are four main limitations to the design and procedures used by Milne and 
Bull (2002) to validate the mnemonic components of the CI. First, there was a limited 
sample size (average n = 5.6 per cell). With so few n per condition they could have 
suffered from low power and not detected existing differences. There were numerical 
differences between their conditions that may have reached significance with a larger 
sample. Second, they failed to examine the interactive effects that each of the 
components have on the other components. In fact, they and others (e.g., Fisher & 
Schreiber, 2007) mention that the benefit of the ECI is the result of the combination of 
the components. They found that the combination of the recall everything instruction and 
context reinstatement produced superior recall compared to all but the context 
reinstatement condition alone. This finding indicates that there could be an advantage to 
including multiple mnemonics in the CI, but their design failed to systematically address 
this issue. Third, they failed to use the full ECI. They did use the rapport building 
component of the ECI, but they failed to examine all of the mnemonic components of the 
ECI, namely they left out the focused imagery component. Lastly, they used an explicit 
encoding instruction with the participants. This is not an ecologically valid approach as 
real witnesses are not aware ahead of time that they are about to view a crime that they 
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will need to remember at a later time. These limitations do not allow any concrete 
conclusions to be drawn about the effectiveness of the ECI, though it does underscore the 
need to study the ECI in its entirety and not in isolation.  
Dando, Wilcock, and Milne (2009) also attempted to validate an individual 
component of the ECI. They examined the usefulness of just the mental reinstatement of 
context portion of the ECI. Dando et al. had participants view a crime video and then 
interviewed them after a brief distractor task. Dando et al. included the initial components 
of the ECI: rapport building, transfer control to the witness, free recall phase, and follow-
up questioning phase. Prior to the free recall phase, Dando et al. manipulated the mental 
context reinstatement instruction between groups. Participants either mentally reinstated 
context, drew a sketch of the original context, or did not reinstate context (control). The 
results showed that both context reinstatement groups were more accurate than the 
control group with no increase in incorrect recall rates. They did report an increase in 
confabulated items in the mental reinstatement of context condition, compared to the 
control and sketch context conditions. The findings reported by Dando et al., like those 
reported by Milne and Bull (2002), further underscore the need to study the ECI in full in 
a way that will allow the combination of the components to be examined.  
Davis et al., (2005) also attempted to validate the use of the mnemonic 
components of the ECI. Unlike Milne and Bull (2002) and others (e.g., Boon & Noon, 
1994; Dando et al. 2009), Davis et al. (2005) used the full ECI and attempted to validate a 
shortened version of the ECI to reduce the amount of time it takes to conduct an 
interview with the ECI. Unlike other studies, Davis et al. used an incidental learning task 
to expose participants to the critical video clip. This is one of the positive aspects of their 
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procedures. Following the initial exposure and a 2-3hr delay participants were 
interviewed in one of three conditions. For the control condition, Davis et al. used the 
structured interview (SI; e.g., Memon, Wark, Holley, Bull, & Koehnken, 1997). The SI 
consists of those components of the ECI that do not include the cognitive mnemonics (cf. 
Memon et al. 1997). Therefore the SI includes building rapport, turning over control of 
the interview, free recall etc. The other two conditions were the full ECI or a modified 
ECI (MCI). The MCI consisted of all of the components of the ECI with the exception of 
the perspective-change and reverse-order recall instructions. These components were 
replaced by two additional free recall attempts. While replacing these components is not 
the most optimal way to evaluate the full ECI, Davis et al. included these components to 
equate the number of interview phases in their design. Their results showed that there 
were no differences between the ECI and MCI in correct recall and both were superior to 
the SI. They also reported that there were no differences among any conditions in 
incorrect, or confabulated recall and no differences in accuracy across the three 
conditions. Davis et al. failed to shorten the amount of time in which it took to conduct 
the MCI in that there were no differences in the amount of time it took to conduct either 
the ECI or the MCI.  
While Davis et al. failed to shorten the interview time, they did use a better 
evaluation technique. They used the full ECI and compared that to their MCI and an SI. 
Removing components from the full ECI and using the full ECI as a comparison 
condition allows for the examination of the combinatory effect of the mnemonic 
components. This is a better technique because, as has previously been discussed, it is 
thought the true benefit of the ECI comes from such a combination (e.g., Fisher & 
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Schreiber, 2007). One downside to the design Davis et al. used was that they removed 
two components at the same time. Therefore the interactive effects of the ECI are less 
clear because the lack of a difference between the ECI and their MCI could be the result 
of removing both components (i.e. they are not necessary) or they could be the result of 
the additional free recall phases added to the MCI to equate for the number of interview 
phases. While this is a limitation there are other, more positive aspects of their design that 
should be highlighted. In addition to their removal/comparison approach to examining the 
ECI, they also used an incidental learning task. Using an incidental learning task is 
important from an ecological validity perspective. Eyewitnesses are not aware that they 
are going to witness a crime a priori, and therefore laboratory experiments should mimic 
this as closely as possible. Also their methods, had they conducted them differently, 
would have allowed them an opportunity to observe any interactive effects that might 
occur with the addition/subtraction of ECI components. The design of Experiment 1 was 
directly motivated by the limitations reviewed here. Namely, it allowed us to examine the 
interactive effects of one of the components of the ECI and do so in a manner that is more 
ecologically valid than most of these validation studies. 
 Other attempts have been made to validate the ECI in a variety of situations. The 
ECI was validated for use with children eyewitnesses (Saywitz, Geiselman, & 
Bornstein,1992) as long as the questions used during the follow-up questioning phase are 
age appropriate (Memon, Cronin, Eaves, & Bull, 1993). However, when children are 
given a cued test following an ECI at a 5-month delay, the benefits of the ECI disappear 
(Flin et al., 1992). The ECI has also been shown to improve eyewitness memory of the 
actual interview itself compared to a control interview (Kohnken, Thurer, & Zoberier, 
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1994). Memon, Holley, Milne, Koehnken, and Bull (1994) failed to revalidate the use of 
the ECI with police officer interviewers, but these results were confounded with the fact 
that not all officer interviewers used all aspects of the ECI. Fisher et al. (1989) also found 
that one of the officers trained to use the ECI failed to do so and there was no subsequent 
improvement in eyewitness recall.  
 Other studies have been published since the ECI was developed, but many of 
those have failed to use the ECI and opted instead for the CI, a problem that Fisher and 
colleagues in particular have pointed out (Fisher & Schreiber, 2007). In fact, Fisher and 
Schreiber argue that the mnemonics of the original CI comprise only about 10% of the 
ECI (but Fisher and Schreiber do not identify the scale for this estimate) and that 
researchers are failing to take full advantage of the other aspects of the technique. A 
meta-analysis of the relevant CI literature also showed that about half of the published 
studies used the original CI compared to the ECI (Kohnken, Milne, Memon, & Bull, 
1999). 
ECI and Eyewitness Identification Accuracy: Foundation for Experiment 2 
 While the ECI has proven useful in facilitating recall, including person 
descriptions, few attempts have been made to apply the ECI to eyewitness identifications. 
Fisher and colleagues have attempted such an application and found that the ECI does not 
improve eyewitness accuracy rates (e.g., Fisher, Quigley, Brock, Chin, & Cutler, 1990 as 
cited in Fisher & Schreiber, 2007). It is difficult to critically evaluate the Fisher at al. 
study, given the brevity of the second-hand description, but Gwyer and Clifford (1997) 
and Finger and Pezdek (1999) also found that the ECI did not improve eyewitness 
identification accuracy. There were some limitations to Gwyer and Clifford’s and Finger 
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and Pezdek’s studies that should be addressed. The maximum delay used in these studies 
was 4 days and 1 week, respectively. This could be an issue because previous research 
has shown that, when eyewitnesses provide detailed verbal description, their 
identification accuracy suffers at shorter delays (for review, see Meissner, Sporer, & 
Schooler, 2007). However, Meissner and Brigham (2001) point out that if the delay is 
sufficient (> 30 minutes), this decrease in accuracy is marginalized. However, the studies 
reported by Meissner and Bringham only had participants give a suspect description, they 
did not conduct a full interview. It could be that a longer delay is necessary for this 
decrease in accuracy to become marginalized. Especially when a more thorough 
interview is conducted (such as the ECI), because of the increase in recall of person 
details that these interviews seem to produce (e.g., Fisher et al. 1990, as cited in Fisher & 
Schreiber, 2007). Further, Finger and Pezdek only used a portion of the ECI’s 
components (omitted reverse-order recall and perspective-change), which limits 
generalization of their findings to the impact that the full ECI will have. Experiment 2 
attempts to clarify the shortcomings in this area of the literature and validate the ECI with 
eyewitness identifications. 
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CHAPTER 3 – EXPERIMENT 1 
The main purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine the usefulness of including the 
focused imagery instruction as part of the ECI. Focused imagery was added to the ECI as 
a way to access multiple types of memory traces based on Paivio’s theory of separate 
memory traces for visual and verbal information (1971). If this theory is correct, then we 
expect that including the focused imagery instruction with the rest of the ECI components 
will improve eyewitness recall and accuracy. On the other hand, as Loftus points out in 
her seminal work, people do not encode exact copies of the events that they witness 
(Loftus, 1979). Instead, they encode the important pieces of the event and use other 
knowledge to fill in the gaps of the memory. This is the reconstructive process of 
memory (Loftus, 1979). In fact, much of the work on eyewitness memory has shown just 
how susceptible memories are to reconstructive errors (D. Davis & Loftus, 2007). If this 
is the case with focused imagery in the ECI, then focused imagery would likely 
contribute to an increase in memory errors and as such, be detrimental to the accuracy of 
eyewitness reports elicited using the ECI.  
Experiment 1 also examined the impact of interview repetition and delay on 
eyewitness memory. These variables were selected because not all eyewitnesses are 
interviewed immediately following a crime and some eyewitnesses are interviewed 
multiple times. Further, the focus imagery mnemonic may be particularly important 
because eyewitnesses could rely on reconstructive processing more at a delay, which 
could impair accurate recall. On the other hand, eyewitnesses could have a greater need 
to cue memory for visual details at a delay, which could be beneficial.  In order to 
achieve more ecological validity than many other studies using the ECI, Experiment 1 
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utilized an incidental learning procedure to mimic what occurs with real eyewitnesses. 
Eyewitnesses rarely expect to witness a crime. 
Finally, Experiment 1 also examined the impact of working memory capacity 
(WMC) on eyewitness performance with the ECI. This is potentially an important 
covariate to examine in the laboratory because it is one that cannot be examined easily in 
the real world even though witnesses most likely vary greatly in WMC across individuals 
and across time for any given individual. Eyewitnesses will have different attentional 
resources when confronted with the critical event and WMC is highly related to available 
attentional resources. It is likely that eyewitnesses with limited WMC will recall less 
information during the free recall portion of the ECI but may maximally benefit from the 
other mnemonic components of the ECI.  
Method 
Participants 
 Seventy-seven participants were recruited for Experiment 1 from introductory 
psychology courses at the University of Oklahoma. All participants were fluent in 
English and over 18 years of age. Of these, only 71 completed all portions of Experiment 
1 and are included in the analyses. Demographic information can be found in Table 3.1. 
Design 
 A 2 (Focused Imagery: present vs. absent) x 2 (Initial Delay: immediate vs. 1-
week) between-subjects design was used to examine the effects on eyewitness memory of 
including focused imagery in the ECI and of delaying the initial interview. See Figure 3.1 
for a graphical representation of the design and procedure. Those participants that were 
interviewed in the immediate condition also returned after a week’s delay for a follow-up 
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interview in the same focused imagery condition. This nested within-subjects factor 
allowed us to examine the effects on eyewitness memory of repeated interviewing. All 
participants were tested and interviewed individually. 
Counterbalancing 
 Previous research has shown that different types of information are more 
dominant than others. Specifically, people recall action details more frequently and 
accurately than other types of information (e.g., Memon et al., 1997). Accordingly, the 
order of the follow-up questions addressing each of these three types of details was 
counterbalanced to control for output interference that could arise because of the 
tendency for eyewitnesses to recall action details first and more predominantly than either 
context or person details. The design was randomized in blocks of 24 to account for the 
six item-order types and four factorial conditions. A total of 72 participants were required 
to fill the full counterbalanced design, however one subject failed to complete all portions 
of the experiment, therefore the design was not completely filled. 
Procedure and stimuli  
After obtaining informed consent for participation and audio recording, 
participants were asked to rate a series of 30 sec video clips as to the likelihood that they 
would experience the events depicted in the videos in everyday life. Four videos were 
presented on a desktop computer, including the critical video depicting a male entering a 
female’s office, conversing with her, and taking some money from her purse while she 
turns around to retrieve a file. The critical video appeared in the third position in the 
sequence to promote the incidental nature of the task and to create some interference as 
would occur in a real-world situation. The filler videos also depicted actions involving 
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people in everyday settings. The videos for Experiment 1 did not contain audio in order 
to eliminate variability due to auditory aspects of the stimuli. Participants gave an 
average rating of 2.18 out of a 7-point Likert scale to the critical video, indicating the 
events in the critical video were unlikely to occur in their normal everyday lives.  
Following the initial rating task, participants completed a working memory 
measure (described below) as a distractor task. The working memory measure is also 
used as a covariate in subsequent analyses. After participants completed the working 
memory measure they were either interviewed (immediate initial interview condition) or 
dismissed and asked to return a week later to complete the rest of the experimental tasks 
(delayed initial interview condition). Participants in the immediate condition, following 
their initial interview, were asked to return a week later to complete the rest of the 
experimental tasks (delayed repeated interview condition). In both the immediate and 
delayed interview conditions, participants were interviewed during the follow-up session. 
After the final interview participants were debriefed and dismissed.  
 Working memory measure. Working memory capacity was measured using a 
counting operation span task (CSPAN; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999), 
which requires participants to count and keep track of the number of blue circles in arrays 
of three-nine circles with a variety of other stimuli present. Trials contained between two 
and six responses. After the response trials participants were then presented with a recall 
box and asked to recall the previous trial numbers in serial order. Participants were 
correct if they reported the serial order correctly for each recall request. The final score 
consisted of the total number of correctly recalled numbers given that the serial order was 
correct.  
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 Interviews. The interview format included all aspects of the ECI as described by 
Fisher and Geiselman (1992) and discussed in Chapter 1, except as modified by the 
manipulations described above. Repeated interviews were conducted using the same 
imagery condition as in the initial interview. The author conducted all interviews for 
Experiment 1, to insure better control of interview quality for this first experiment using 
the ECI, notwithstanding that the author was obviously not naïve to the design or 
hypotheses in the current experiment. During the initial phase of the interview the 
interviewer greeted the participants and rapport was established. Following this phase of 
the interview, the instruction phase occurred in which the interviewer explained the 
parameters of the interview and the expectations of the subject during the interview. Any 
questions were answered and the interviewer then delivered the recall instructions. The 
recall instructions for the free recall phase included the instruction to recall everything, 
no matter the perceived relevance, and the mental reinstatement of context instruction. 
Following the free recall phase instructions, the interviewer answered any questions the 
participants had and then turned the interview over to the subject to begin the free recall 
session. Participants were never interrupted during the free recall phase and it lasted until 
a period of silence persisted for at least one-minute.  
 Following the free recall phase, participants were asked follow-up questions in a 
counterbalanced order as described earlier. To the extent that participants received 
focused imagery instructions, they were given at this point. For focused imagery, 
participants were instructed to close their eyes and try to recall the images from the 
critical event and report the relevant item type details from those images. During the 
follow-up questioning phase participants were asked open-ended questions about 
	  25 
information that they had produced in the free recall phase and about subsequent 
information that they recalled during the follow-up questioning phase. Participants were 
never asked questions about information from which they had not recalled at least some 
detail (e.g., if they mentioned the perpetrator they were then asked if they would describe 
the perpetrator). After the follow-up questions were exhausted, participants were then 
asked to perform a reverse-order recall task. After the reverse-order recall was complete, 
participants were asked to perform a perspective-change recall task. Again, participants 
were never interrupted during these phases of the ECI and recall continued until a full 
minute had passed since the subject’s most recent output. Following this phase 
participants were debriefed (assuming it was the last or only interview) and dismissed.  
Scoring procedure. The scoring procedure that is used for the proposed studies is 
similar to that used by other researchers with the ECI (e.g., Hutcheson, Baxter, Telfer, & 
Warden, 1995; Milne & Bull, 2002) with one exception: Individual item types were 
scored as action, context, and person information as opposed to action, person, object, 
and surrounding item types. The object and surrounding item types were combined into a 
general context item type for simplicity and because of the difficulty in distinguishing 
between the two types. Individual reported details were scored as correct, as incorrect 
(e.g., recalling a blue shirt when it was red), or as a confabulation (e.g., recalling a 
getaway car when there was no car present in the scene), and these scores were used to 
calculate an output-bound accuracy measure (e.g., Gudjonsson & Clare, 1995; Pansky, 
Koriat, & Goldsmith, 2005). Output-bound accuracy is simply the number of correctly 
recalled items divided by all recalled items. Output-bound accuracy has been argued as a 
more appropriate measurement technique because it not only reflects correct recall but 
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incorrect recall and confabulation details (e.g., Fisher & Schreiber, 2007). Output-bound 
accuracy is also arguably more appropriate from an eyewitness perspective because it 
reflects not only the quantity but also the quality of the information recalled by the 
eyewitness. It is often more important in a legal setting that whatever the eyewitnesses 
produce—for example, on the witness stand—be accurate than that they produce as much 
information as possible. In addition, high levels of incorrect recall waste law enforcement 
time and resources (e.g., Pansky et al. 2005).  
Results 
Analysis of WMC Covariance with Focused Imagery and Delay 
 The results of the CSPAN task were analyzed using a 2 (Focused Imagery: 
Present vs. Absent) x 2 (Initial Delay: Immediate vs. 1-week) between-subjects 
ANCOVA with the CSPAN score for each subject used as a covariate. The results 
showed that CSPAN performance did not significantly account for any additional 
variance in the model, F < 1. The CSPAN results were not used in any other analyses 
because they failed to account for any additional variance.  
Analysis of Single Interview Overall Accuracy Rates  
A 2 (Focused Imagery: Present vs. Absent) x 2 (Initial Delay: Immediate vs. 1-
week) between-subjects ANOVA was used to examine overall eyewitness accuracy in 
Experiment 1. Figure 3.2 displays the results. The results showed that there was a 
significant main effect for initial delay, F (1, 67) = 14.54, MSE = .086, p = .0003, recall 
was more accurate for the immediate interviews (M = .96, SE = .009) than for the delayed 
interviews (M = .70, SE = .07). There was a marginal main effect of imagery, F (1, 67) = 
2.96, MSE = .086, p = .089 showing that recall was more accurate with focused imagery 
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(M = .89, SE = .04) than with no focused imagery (M = .77, SE = .07). There was no 
significant interaction between imagery and delay, F (1, 67) = 2.31, MSE = .086, p > .1. 
Simple effects analyses for the delayed interview condition showed that there was a 
marginal difference between the focused imagery conditions, t (34) = 1.65, p = .10, such 
that participants in the focused imagery condition were more accurate at a 1-week delay 
(M = .81, SE = .07) than participants in the no focused imagery condition (M = .59, SE = 
.11). A simple-effects analysis for the immediate interview conditions showed that there 
was no significant difference between the focused imagery conditions t (33) = .66, p = 
.51, participants in the immediate focused imagery condition were just as accurate (M = 
.97, SE = .01) as those in the immediate no focused imagery condition (M = .93, SE = 
.02). These results thus provide weak evidence that there is a benefit for using the ECI 
with focused imagery at a delay and no benefit during the initial interview.  
Analysis of Repeated Interview Overall Accuracy Rates 
A 2 (Focused Imagery: Present vs. Absent) x 2 (Interview: Immediate vs. 
Repeated) mixed-model ANOVA with the last factor as the within-subjects factor was 
used to examine the impact of focused imagery on repeated interview accuracy. Figure 
3.3 displays the results. The results revealed no significant main effects or interactions, 
all F’s < 1. 
Item Type Analyses for Single Interviews 
 The results were further broken down by item type (i.e. Action, Context and 
Person details) and analyzed with a 2 (Focused Imagery: Present vs. Absent) x 2 (Delay: 
Immediate vs. 1-week) x 3 (Item Type: Action, Context, Person) mixed-model AVOVA 
with the last factor the within-subjects factor and output-bound accuracy as the dependent 
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variable. Figure 3.4 displays the results. There was an overall significant main effect of 
delay, F (1, 67) = 18.28, MSE = .173, p < .0001, which showed that participants were 
more accurate in the immediate interview conditions, (M = .86, SE = .01) than in the 
delayed interview conditions, (M = .62, SE = .06). There was also a significant main 
effect of focused imagery, F (1, 67) = 6.50, MSE = .173, p = .01, that showed that 
participants were more accurate when they used focused imagery (M = .81, SE = .03) 
than when they did not (M = .66, SE = .06).  
 The present analysis treating item type explicitly as a within-subjects factor thus 
yields a different statistical conclusion for the main effect of focused imagery than when 
item type is ignored as in the earlier analysis. This discrepancy is in part due to different 
weightings of the individual item types based on the differences in the number of 
individual items within each item type. Because there happened to be a different number 
of items available to recall for each item type (N action = 51, N context = 56, N person = 
36), they are weighted differently in the aggregated analyses. Therefore, the differences 
in the overall accuracy rates reported previously and the segregated analyses reported 
here are in part an artifact of the unequal weighting of item types in the aggregated 
analyses reported earlier. Only in the present analysis are certain effects detected, when 
the equal weighting of items is taken into account. Therefore, it could be argued that this 
is a more appropriate way to analyze these data because they are not affected by the 
different number of items that happened to be available for each item type. 
 A further argument can be made for examining the results based on item type. 
The item type factor is a within-subjects factor and the variance associated with that 
factor is being absorbed into the error term of the aggregated analysis. Treating it as a 
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within-subjects factor here allows for its within-subjects variance to be segregated from 
the error term in the model. This is a more appropriate treatment because it allows 
between-subjects effects to be appropriately detected.   
The results showed that there was a significant main effect for item type, F (2, 
134) = 39.21, MSE = .018, p < .0001, that indicated differences in item type accuracy 
rates for action (M = .83, SE = .04), context (M = .76, SE = .04), and person (M = .63, SE 
= .03) details. The results also showed a marginal interaction between delay and focused 
imagery, F (1, 67) = 3.37, MSE = .173, p = .07, indicating that there is a difference in 
accuracy at different delays depending on the focused imagery condition. These effects 
are explored in more detail in subsequent analyses. There were no other significant 
interactions to report, all other F’s < 1. 
 The interaction in this model is similar to the interaction reported previously for 
the overall eyewitness accuracy and the conclusions are similar in this case. The 
interaction between delay and focused imagery is driven by significantly poorer 
performance in the delayed-no imagery condition, compared to the delayed-imagery 
condition.  There was a marginal simple effect of focused imagery in the immediate 
interview condition reflecting an advantage when focused imagery was used, F (1, 33) = 
3.91, MSE = .01, p = .056. There was also a significant simple effect of focused imagery 
in the delayed condition reflecting an advantage when focused imagery was used, F (1, 
34) = 5.11, MSE = .33, p = .03. These results show that the marginal interaction is driven 
by a greater effect of focused imagery for delayed interviews, as compared to immediate 
interviews.  
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 Further analyses were performed to examine the interaction between focused 
imagery and delay for each individual item type. A 2 (Focused Imagery: Present vs. 
Absent) x 2 (Delay: Immediate vs. 1-week) between-subjects ANOVA examined the 
accuracy rates for action details. The results showed that there was a significant main 
effect of delay, F (1, 67) = 14.38, MSE = .085, p = .0003, participants recalled action 
details significantly more accurately during immediate interviews (M = .96, SE = .009) 
than during delayed interviews (M = .70, SE = .07). There was also a marginal main 
effect for focused imagery for action details, F (1, 67) = 3.03, MSE = .085, p = .086, that 
showed action details were recalled nominally more accurately when focused imagery 
was used (M = .89, SE = .038) than when no focused imagery was used (M = .76, SE = 
.066). The interaction between delay and focused imagery failed to reach significance, F 
(1, 67) = 2.25, MSE = .085, p = .14.  
Planned comparisons examining accuracy rates for the main effect of item type 
revealed that action details were significantly more accurate than person details and there 
was no difference in accuracy between the action and context details, F (1, 210) = 15.42, 
MSE = .09, p < .0001, F (1, 210) = 1.92, MSE = .09, p = .167, respectively. Context 
details were also recalled more accurately than person details, F (1, 210) = 6.46, MSE = 
.09, p = .01. These differences in accuracy are driven largely by the significantly higher 
incorrect recall rates for person details compared to action and context details, F (1, 67) = 
100.72, MSE = 5.25, p < .0001, F (1, 67) = 68.16, MSE = 4.33, p < .0001, respectively. 
The difference in accuracy rates across item types is also due to lower overall correct 
recall rates of person details compared to action and context details, F (1, 67) = 121.60, 
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MSE = 38.65, p <.0001, F (1, 67) = 36.05, MSE = 23.34, p < .0001, respectively. Mean 
recall rates by item type are in Table 3.2.  
A 2 (Focused Imagery: Present vs. Absent) x 2 (Delay: Immediate vs. 1-week) 
between-subjects ANOVA also examined the accuracy rates for context details. A 
significant main effect of delay, F (1, 67) = 13.66, MSE = .071, p = .0004, showed that 
participants were more accurate during immediate interviews (M = .88, SE = .016) than 
during delayed interviews (M = .64, SE = .06) for context details. There was also a 
significant main effect of focused imagery, F (1, 67) = 5.25, MSE = .071, p = .025, that 
showed that participants are more accurate when focused imagery is used in the 
interviews (M = .83, SE = .037) than they were when no focused imagery was used (M = 
.68, SE = .06). There was also a significant interaction, F (1, 67) = 4.65, MSE = .071, p = 
.034, that indicates that there were greater differences in accuracy rates in the focused 
imagery conditions, across the delay conditions. Simple effects analyses showed that 
indeed, this interaction is the result of a participants recalling more accurately in delayed 
interviews when focused imagery (M = .78, SE = .071) was used, t (34) = 2.32, p = .026, 
compared to when no focused imagery was used (M = .50, SE = .098). The simple effects 
analysis between the immediate focused imagery conditions showed that there were no 
differences between the immediate focused imagery condition (M = .88, SE =.02) and the 
immediate no focused imagery condition (M = .87, SE = .027), t (33) = .19, p = .22.  
Person detail accuracy rates were also examined with a 2 (Focused Imagery: 
Present vs. Absent) x 2 (Delay: Immediate vs. 1-week) between-subjects ANOVA. The 
results showed a significant main effect of delay, F (1, 67) = 18.62, MSE = .052, p < 
.0001, that indicates that participants were more accurate during immediate interviews (M 
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= .75, SE = .02) than during delayed interviews (M = .52, SE = .05). A significant main 
effect for focused imagery, F (1, 67) = 10.24, MSE = .05, p = .002, also shows that 
participants were more accurate when focused imagery was used (M = .72, SE = .03) than 
when no focused imagery was used in the interview (M = .54, SE = .05). The interaction 
between focused imagery and delay for person accuracy failed to reach significance, F (1, 
67) = 1.77, MSE = .05, p = .18. Simple effect analyses revealed that participants were 
significantly more accurate for person details when focused imagery was used during 
immediate interviews (M = .80, SE = .029) than when no focused imagery was used in 
immediate interviews (M = .63, SE = .032), t (33) = 2.31, p = .027. Simple effects 
analysis also showed that participants were significantly more accurate for person details 
when focused imagery was used at a delay (M = .64, SE = .057) than when no focused 
imagery was used at a delay (M = .39, SE = .079), t (34) = 2.49, p = .017. The simple 
effect show that there is an advantage for person detail accuracy when focused imagery is 
used both immediately and at a 1-week delay. Further analyses revealed that participants 
were significantly more accurate in the focused imagery condition when interviewed 
immediately compared to a delay, t (34) = 2.48, p = .018. Participants were also 
significantly more accurate when interviewed immediately when no focused imagery is 
used compared to a delay, t (33) = 3.48, p = .001.  
Item Type Analyses for Repeated Interviews 
The repeated-interview accuracy results were also broken down by item type and 
examined with a 2 (Focused Imagery: Present vs. Absent) x 3 (ItemType: Action, Person, 
Context) x 2 (Interview: Immediate vs. Repeated) mixed-model ANOVA with the last 
two factors as the within-subjects factors. Figure 3.5 displays the results. There was no 
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significant main effect of focused imagery, F < 1. The results showed that there was an 
overall main effect for item type, F (2, 66) = 67.14, MSE = .013, p < .0001. Action details 
were recalled at a higher rate (M = .95, SE = .015) than were context details (M = .87, SE 
= .017) and person details (M = .73, SE = .02). There was also a significant interaction 
between item type and focused imagery across time, F (2, 66) = 3.60, MSE = .013, p = 
.032. No other main effects or interactions were significant, all F’s < 1. 
A simple effects analysis showed that the interaction between item type and 
focused imagery was the result of the higher accuracy rates for person details during the 
initial interview with focused imagery (M = .80, SE = .03) condition compared to the no 
focused imagery (M = .70, SE = .032) condition, t (33) = 2.31, p = .027. These 
differences in accuracy rates for person details did not emerge with repeated interviews, t 
(33) = .91, p = .37. There were no differences in accuracy for action details across the 
focused imagery conditions for immediate interviews, t (33) = .81, p = .4. There were 
also no differences in accuracy for action details for repeated interviews, t (33) = -.89, p = 
.38. Further analyses failed to find any significant differences in accuracy for context 
details for either immediate interviews, t (33) = .19, p = .84, or repeated interviews, t (33) 
= -.25, p = .80, regardless of whether focused imagery was used.  
Item Gains and Losses 
The last analyses examine the impact of focused imagery on the number of items 
participants gained or lost across repeated interviews. Items gained are items that were 
recalled during the repeated interview given that they were not recalled during the initial 
interview. Items lost are those items that were recalled during the immediate interview 
that were not recalled during the repeated interview.  
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As for items gained, a 2 (Focused Imagery: Imagery vs. No Imagery) x 3 (Item 
Type: Action, Context, Person) mixed-model ANOVA with item type as the within-
subjects factor show that there was no main effect on item gains across the focused 
imagery conditions, F < 1. Results are displayed in Figure 3.6. The results showed there 
was a significant Item Type effect on gains, F (1, 33) = 7.66, MSE = .0009, p = .001.  
Within-subjects contrasts showed that the were more overall gains in person details 
compared to context details, F (1, 33) = 12.54, MSE = .0016, p = .001. A contrast also 
showed that overall there were more item gains for Action details than for context details, 
F (1, 33) = 13.56, MSE = .0016, p = .0008. These results show that regardless of whether 
focused imagery was used there were significantly more gains for action and person 
details during the repeated interview. There was no interaction between the focused 
imagery conditions and Item Types, F < 1.  
As for items lost across the delay between repeated interviews, a 2 (Focused 
Imagery: Imagery vs. No Imagery) x 3 (Item Type: Action, Context, Person) mixed-
model ANOVA with Item Type as the within-subjects factor showed that there was no 
main effect on item losses across the focused imagery conditions, F < 1. Results are 
displayed in Figure 3.7. The results show that again there was a main effect of losses for 
Item Type, F (2, 66) = 9.51, MSE = .001, p = .0002. Within-subjects contrasts showed 
that there significantly more action and person details lost during the repeated interview 
regardless of focused imagery, F (1, 33) = 18.45, MSE = .002, p < .0001, F (1, 33) = 
8.72, MSE = .002, p = .005, respectively. The interaction between focused imagery and 
item type for losses was also not significant, F (2, 66) = 2.44, MSE = .001, p = .095.  
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These results show that while there was better retention of person details with focused 
imagery in the ECI and more gains of both action and person details overall, there were 
also more overall losses of action and person details across both types of the ECI during 
the repeated interview.  
Discussion 
 The results from the present experiment show that using the focused imagery 
instruction with the ECI is beneficial to eyewitnesses. This benefit is particularly 
noticeable after a 1-week delay between the critical event and the initial interview. The 
results for the longer delay-focused imagery condition are in line with Paivio’s (1971) 
theory that participants may be able to access both verbal and visual traces more 
effectively. In particular, the results showed that person details were recalled more 
accurately when focused imagery was used compared to no focused imagery. This 
advantage in accuracy for person details when focused imagery was used was observed 
when the interview was conducted immediately following the critical event and when the 
initial interview was delayed for 1-week. These results further support the contention that 
eyewitnesses may benefit from accessing visual information for person details with the 
focused imagery component of the ECI (e.g., Paivio, 1971). 
 Further conditional analyses show an advantage for person and action detail gains 
across repeated ECI interviews. This was true regardless of whether focused imagery was 
used. However, there were also more action and person details lost across repeated 
interviews regardless of whether focused imagery was used. These results show a clear 
trade-off in memory performance across repeated interviews using the ECI. This trade-off 
in gains and losses could be due to a number of factors. One possible explanation is that 
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the interactive effects of the mnemonic components of the ECI could cause a trade-off in 
the types of information retained across repeated interviews. Another explanation is that 
the new items that were recalled in the follow-up interviews could cause some 
interference that prevents the lost items from being recalled. This issue will be explored 
further in Chapter 5.  
 The overall results indicate that the focused imagery instruction is a beneficial 
portion of the ECI, especially when the interview is delayed for 1 week. The design used 
in Experiment 1 allows assessment of the impact of the individual component of focused 
imagery to be examined within the ECI. Using such a design could ultimately allow for 
the examination of the interactive effects of the combination of components in the ECI. 
Fisher and Schreiber (2007) have argued that this interaction is key to the success of the 
ECI. Therefore, utilizing such an experimental design in future experiments could allow 
for the examination of the interactive benefits of the ECI. 
The results of the current experiment, while mixed, do show that there is a benefit 
for using the full ECI with focused imagery during initial interviews because eyewitness 
accuracy for person details is superior in this instance. This could prove maximally 
beneficial from an eyewitness identification perspective because eyewitnesses could 
provide investigators a more accurate description of suspects. This could allow a more 
accurate eyewitness lineup to be constructed (e.g., Malpass, Tredoux, & McQuiston-
Surrett, 2007). If this is the case then an argument must be made for using the ECI during 
both immediate and delayed initial interviews. It could be maximally beneficial to use the 
ECI immediately and have witnesses return at a delay to make an identification. A longer 
	  37 
delay between descriptions and identifications has been shown to positively impact 
eyewitness accuracy (e.g., Meissner et al., 2007). Experiment 2 explores this further. 
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CHAPTER 4 – EXPERIMENT 2 
Previous studies have shown that, relative to other interview techniques, the ECI 
generally has a negligible impact on suspect identification accuracy (Finger & Pezdek, 
1999; Gwyer & Clifford, 1997). This is despite the fact that witnesses tend to generate 
more detailed suspect descriptions with the ECI (e.g., Fisher et al., 1990 as cited in Fisher 
& Schreiber, 2007). The previous studies using the ECI have either not utilized all of the 
components of the ECI (Finger & Pezdek, 1999), or failed to use what could be better 
lineups (Gwyer & Clifford, 1997), or do not provide enough detail to fully understand the 
methods used (e.g., Fisher et al., 1990 as cited in Fisher & Schreiber, 2007). These 
limitations are troubling given the positive findings reported in Experiment 1 with person 
details and other reports in the literature that have shown similar benefits with the ECI 
(for review, see Fisher & Schreiber, 2007). The current experiment seeks to address these 
limitations and examine whether the ECI can be used to facilitate eyewitness 
identification accuracy. 
The current experiment investigates two potential reasons for this surprising null 
effect. The first is the use of a non-optimal lineup generation procedure. Gywer and 
Clifford constructed their lineups by selecting foils based on the physical features that 
they shared with the suspect. Malpass et al. (2007) discuss the drawbacks of this selection 
criterion and argue lineups be generated based on eyewitness descriptions of the suspects. 
In fact, Malpass and Devine (1981) found that when eyewitness descriptions of the 
suspect are used, more accurate identifications are made.  
The second potential reason for this surprising null effect is verbal 
overshadowing. Verbal overshadowing refers to an impairment in the accuracy of 
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identifying a non-verbal stimulus (e.g., suspect) after verbally describing the stimulus 
(Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). Verbal overshadowing has been shown to have a 
negative effect on the accuracy of face identification (for a review, see Meissner & 
Brigham, 2001) and has been implicated as an important factor in eyewitness 
identification of suspects (Brown, Lloyd-Jones, & Robinson, 2008; Meissner, 2002). 
Verbal overshadowing is particularly problematic for the ECI because elaborative 
techniques such as perspective changing and reverse-order recall that can increase the 
amount of information that is recalled verbally, tend to exacerbate verbal overshadowing 
effects (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Thus, when eyewitnesses are asked to make a 
suspect identification shortly after going through an ECI, whatever potential benefits the 
ECI might have on suspect identification accuracy are likely thwarted by such verbal 
overshadowing.  
However, Finger and Pezdek (1999) found that when a delay is introduced 
between an interview that uses some aspects of the ECI and the identification task, the 
verbal overshadowing effect disappears. Others have also shown that inserting a delay 
between suspect descriptions and suspect identifications improves identification 
accuracy, resulting in a release from the verbal overshadowing effect (Lloyd-Jones & 
Brown, 2008; Meissner, 2002; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Further, as the results from 
Experiment 1 show, when an interview was repeated at a one-week delay, very few 
person details are lost. This could mean that when the ECI is used, the verbal 
overshadowing effect is prolonged. However, based on the results from Experiment 1, the 
visual traces of those items might be retained when participants are asked to make an 
identification, which should release them from the verbal overshadowing effect. The 
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current study will address these shortcomings in the literature and attempt to apply the 
ECI in a way that is beneficial to eyewitness identification research.  
Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-six participants were recruited for the current experiment from psychology 
courses (28 from Introduction to Psychology and 33 from Cognitive Psychology) at the 
University of Oklahoma. Five participants failed to follow instructions and were 
subsequently discarded from the analyses leaving N = 61. Participants received course 
credit for participation. All participants were self-described as fluent in English and over 
18 years old. See Table 4.1 for demographic information. 
Design 
 To utilize the benefit of information retention—as discussed with Experiment 1, 
we used a delay between the interview and identification task to increase the accuracy of 
the suspect identification—a 2 (Interview Type: SI vs. ECI) × 2 (Lineup Type: target 
present vs. target absent) between-subjects design was used. See Figure 4.1 for a 
graphical depiction of the design. All eyewitness identifications were performed at a one-
week delay based on the results from previous studies that show the maximal benefit for 
a release from verbal overshadowing occurs at a delay (e.g., Finger & Pezdek, 1999).  
Materials 
 The materials used in Experiment 2 were similar to those used in Experiment 1 
with the following exceptions. The videos used in the current experiment contained 
sound to add more ecological validity to the stimuli. The critical video depicted the theft 
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of a cellular telephone, whereas the critical video in Experiment 1 depicted the theft of 
money from a purse.  
Procedure 
As in Experiment 1, after consent was obtained, participants performed an 
implicit rating task on a series of videos (discussed in Materials) followed by the CSPAN 
task, described in Experiment 1. Following the CSPAN task participants were 
interviewed in their randomly assigned interview condition. After the interview was 
completed participants were reminded of their follow-up appointments and dismissed. 
During their follow-up sessions participants completed the suspect identification task. 
After this task was complete, participants were debriefed and dismissed. The ECI was 
conducted in a similar manner to the description in Experiment 1 that included focused 
imagery. The SI was comprised of all of the components of the ECI except the cognitive 
mnemonic components (cf. Memon et al. 1997). Additionally, to equate the phases of the 
two interviews, the SI used additional free recall attempts in the place of the perspective-
change and reverse-order recall phases of the ECI. 
Interviewers and interviewer training 
For Experiment 2, two undergraduate students were trained by the author to 
conduct two types of interviews—the Structured Interview (SI) and the Enhanced 
Cognitive Interview (ECI)--using training procedures similar to those used by other 
researchers in the eyewitness literature (e.g., Gwyer & Clifford, 1997). Training was 
conducted on an individual basis and included written instructions for added clarification. 
Interviewers received training in: beginning an interview, building rapport, transferring 
control of the interview to the witness, practicing good interview behavior, facilitating an 
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interview, note-taking for follow-up questioning, designing questions, using the cognitive 
components of the ECI, and closing an interview. Guidelines were provided for all 
possible conditions, so that the interviews would be administered as similarly as possible. 
Training techniques included individual instruction, role-playing, and multiple individual 
practice sessions. All interviewers were required to practice the SI and ECI techniques as 
well as social/conversational principles of investigative interviewing. 
Additionally, all interviewers received instructions on the importance of fair and 
unbiased lineup presentations, including avoiding providing feedback to the 
eyewitnesses, and avoiding biased lineup instructions (e.g., Malpass et al., 2007). Prior to 
running participants, the author tested each interviewer’s knowledge of interviewing 
methods and reviewed the necessary components and the interviewers were periodically 
monitored by the author to ensure there was no drift away from ECI and SI procedures. 
The interviewers were naïve to the theoretical reasoning of the design and to the 
predicted outcomes for Experiment 2.  
Lineup Construction 
 The lineup construction was based on the guidelines described by Malpass et al. 
(2007). Typically, lineup construction—the selection of lineup foils—is based either on 
similarity to a suspect’s features or on eyewitness descriptions of the perpetrator. Malpass 
and colleagues suggested that eyewitness lineups should be constructed, when possible, 
based on eyewitness descriptions. Research has shown that using eyewitness descriptions 
of perpetrators to generate lineups leads to the most effective and least biased lineup 
construction (Malpass & Devine, 1981; Malpass et al., 2007). Malpass et al. have 
demonstrated that the relationship between lineup bias and effective size is quite 
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dependent based on the choosing rate of witnesses. Malpass et al. (2007) define an 
unbiased lineup as a lineup in which each lineup member has an equal chance of being 
selected. Effective lineups are those in which a naïve participant is equally likely to select 
any of the foils (including the suspect) based on an adequate description. Furthermore, 
this lineup construction method is thought particularly useful for the ECI because of the 
superior accuracy rates for person details recalled during the ECI. Accordingly, we used 
each participant’s description of the perpetrator as the basis for selecting foils for the 
lineup. To the extent that participants did not generate enough person details for the 
perpetrator during the interview to construct an effective lineup, lineup selection was 
based on a randomly selected lineup based on the few details given (Malpass et al., 
2007). Lineups were constructed during the week’s delay between the interview 
(conducted immediately after the witnessed crime) and the identification task. Each 
participant’s lineup was constructed by the author, who was then blind to a participant’s 
interview condition. Lineup foils were selected from the Florida Department of 
Corrections Offender database 
(http://www.dc.state.fl.us/InmateInfo/InmateInfoMenu.asp). Not surprisingly, there was a 
significant negative correlation between the number of descriptors provided by a 
participant and the number of possible foils available from the database that matched the 
description, r = -.53, p < .0001. 
 Simultaneous lineups—those in which all photos are presented at once in an 
array—were used, inasmuch as research has shown that there are few instances in which 
there are differences in accurate identification rates between simultaneous and sequential 
lineups, and those differences do not clearly favor one type of lineup (Carlson, Gronlund, 
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& Clark, 2008; Gronlund, Carlson, Dailey, & Goodsell, 2009). Furthermore, 
simultaneous lineups are most commonly used in the United States by law enforcement 
officials (Malpass et al. 2007). In the current experiment the suspect (guilty for target 
present [TP] lineups; innocent for target absent [TA]) was in the fifth position of a six-
person lineup photo array (the bottom middle position of a 2 x 3 matrix). Therefore, the 
lineup for a participant was based as closely as possible to the participant’s description of 
the suspect, in order to have the fairest lineup possible. TA lineups were constructed 
similarly, except that the fifth position was filled with a sixth foil based solely on the 
participant’s perpetrator description. 
Results 
Analyses of Overall Recall Accuracy 
 A 2 (Interview Type: ECI vs. SI) x 2 (Lineup Type: TP vs. TA) between-subjects 
ANOVA was used to examine the impact that the ECI and SI had on eyewitness recall. 
Figure 4.2 displays the results. The results revealed that there were no significant main 
effects of interview type or lineup type on overall accuracy, nor was there a significant 
interaction of those variables, Fs < 1. Separate analyses were conducted with the 
proportion of correct, total incorrect recall and total confabulations; no effects or 
interactions were significant, Fs < 2.80, p > .1. 
Analyses of Accuracy by Item Type 
 The results of Experiment 2 were further broken down by item type. A 2 
(Interview Type: ECI vs. SI) x 2 (Lineup Type: TP vs. TA) x 4 (Item Type: Action, 
Context, Conversation, and Person) mixed-model ANOVA with item type as the within-
subjects factor examined the impact that the ECI and SI have on eyewitness at the item 
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type level. Figure 4.3 displays accuracy results. The results showed that there again were 
no significant differences in accuracy or interactions between the interview type and 
lineup type factors, nor did they interact with the item type variable. This finding is 
particularly surprising because we did see differences in Experiment 1, particularly for 
person details. This makes it difficult to expect any differences in identification accuracy 
because there was no advantage for person details for the ECI.  
There was a significant difference in accuracy at the item type level, F (3, 174) = 
24.38, MSE = .016, p < .0001. Further contrasts collapsing across interview and lineup 
types showed that action details were significantly more accurate than context details, F 
(1, 58) = 31.97, MSE = .024, p < .0001. Action details were also significantly more 
accurate than person details, F (1, 58) = 64.52, MSE = .024, p < .0001. These differences 
show the superiority of action details accuracy that has previously been reported in the 
literature (e.g., Memon et al. 1997). There were no significant differences between action 
details and conversation details, F < 1. Further contrasts showed that recall of person 
details was also significantly less accurate than that for context details, F (1, 58) = 6.09, 
MSE = .031, p = .016. These results are similar to those of Experiment 1 in which person 
details were less accurate than other details types. Conversation details were also more 
accurate than person details, F (1, 58) = 45.39, MSE = .031, p < .0001. There was also an 
accuracy advantage for conversation details over context details, F (1, 58) = 10.81, MSE 
= .049, p = .0017, which shows that eyewitnesses were more accurate for conversational 
aspects of the stimuli than contextual aspects.  
 Next, we collapsed across interview and lineup conditions and performed 
analyses on incorrect and confabulation rates as they directly impact accuracy. Mean 
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recall rates for recall types collapsed across conditions can be found in Table 4.2. These 
analyses revealed that the differences in item type accuracy rates are driven by higher 
incorrect and confabulation recall rates in the context and person details. In particular 
person details showed higher levels of both incorrect and confabulated items than did 
action details, F (1, 58) = 55.14, MSE = 3.60, p < .0001, and F (1, 58) = 8.77,  MSE = 
.538, p = .0044, respectively. This explains the poorer accuracy rates for person details in 
Experiment 2. There were also higher incorrect recall rates for context details than for 
actions details, F (1, 58) = 34.24, MSE = 1.49. Participants in Experiment 2 also recalled 
more incorrect context details than conversation details, F (1, 58) = 31.25, MSE = 1.61, p 
< .0001. An additional contrast showed that there were higher incorrect recall rates for 
person details compared to context details, F (1, 58) = 18.36, MSE = 2.63, p < .0001. No 
other contrast reached significance Fs < 2.34, ps > .13. These results show that the 
differences in accuracy rates were driven by higher incorrect and confabulation recall 
rates. These higher rates were largely in the person and context detail types. The results 
reported here are not in line with the results reported in Experiment 1 for person details.  
Analyses of Suspect Descriptions  
 A 2 (Interview Type: ECI vs. SI) x 2 (Lineup Type: TP vs. TA) between-subjects 
ANOVA examining the suspect descriptions revealed that there was a significant main 
effect of interview type, F(1, 56) = 4.42, MSE = 4.10, p = .04. These results show that the 
ECI (M = 6.13) elicited more overall suspect descriptors than did the SI (M = 5.03). 
These findings replicated the findings reported by Fisher and colleagues (e.g., Fisher et 
al., 1990 as cited in Fisher & Schreiber, 2007). We also examined suspect descriptions by 
recalled item type (i.e., correct, incorrect, and confabulations) and found no significant 
	  47 
differences for interview type, lineup type or an interaction between the two, Fs < 1.01, 
ps > .3. These findings are not in line with the overall suspect descriptor advantage 
reported above. It seems that while the overall number of descriptors reported may have 
reached significance, these findings may merely be an artifact of a nominal increase in 
incorrect recall in the ECI condition. Therefore the findings reported by Fisher and 
colleagues may be an artifact of a nominal increase in incorrect description information. 
However, because of the brevity of their description, we cannot know this for certain. 
Lineup Performance 
 A Chi-Square analysis comparing the overall accuracy rates between the ECI and 
SI conditions showed no significant differences, χ2 (1, N = 30) = .03, p = .86. Figure 4.4 
displays the results. A Chi-Square analysis comparing overall accuracy rates between the 
TP and TA lineup conditions also revealed no significant differences, χ2 (1, N = 30) = 
.31, p = .58. Figure 4.5 displays the results. A Chi-Square analysis comparing the 
accuracy rates of participants that chose an individual in the lineup and those that did not 
also revealed no significant differences, χ2 (1, N = 20) = .56, p = .46. Figure 4.6 displays 
the results. These results show that there was no significant impact on eyewitness 
identification accuracy for lineup type, interview type, or conditionalized on participants 
that chose an individual from a lineup. These results are in line with previous results in 
the ECI literature (e.g., Gwyer & Clifford, 1997). 
Lineup Construction Evaluation 
 Analyses examining correlations between overall suspect information recalled, 
correct suspect information recalled, suspect information recall accuracy, identification 
accuracy, propensity to choose and lineup foils available were also conducted. Of these, 
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only one correlation reached significance, which was the negative correlation between the 
overall amount of suspect information recalled and the number of available foils to select 
from the foil database, r = -.53, p < .0001. These results indicate that there was no 
relationship between the amount of accurate suspect information recalled and lineup 
selection. 
Discussion 
 The results showed that there was no advantage for the ECI compared to the SI 
for recall accuracy. There were also no differences in recall accuracy for the lineup type 
conditions. They also show that there was poorer recall accuracy for several key item 
types that did not differ across the between-subjects variables. Specifically, there were 
poorer accuracy rates with person details that were caused by higher incorrect recall rates. 
Therefore, Experiment 2 failed to replicate the findings both of Experiment 1, and prior 
studies that have shown that the ECI is superior to the SI in both overall recall and 
accuracy. This lack of a finding does not support the use of the ECI over multiple free 
recall trials such as was used in the SI. The results from Experiment 2 also question the 
usefulness of the cognitive mnemonics used in the ECI because they did not prove to be 
more useful in the current experiment as they have in previously published studies (cf. 
Fisher & Schreiber, 2007).  
 The results of Experiment 2 also showed that there was no advantage to using the 
ECI with regards to eyewitness lineup identification accuracy. While these findings are 
surprising, given the care taken to design Experiment 2, they are in line with other studies 
that examined eyewitness identification accuracy within the ECI framework (e.g., Finger 
& Pezdek, 1999; Gwyer & Clifford, 1997). There were also no differences between the 
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accuracy rates between TP or TA lineups. Further, there were no differences in accuracy 
between choosers and non-choosers. These results failed to find any benefit for using 
either the ECI or the SI with regards to eyewitness identification performance.  
 From a practical perspective, Experiment 2 shows the complexities of using the 
ECI in a study of this nature. While Experiment 1 showed a benefit for using the full ECI 
for person details, Experiment 2 failed to show such a benefit. While Experiment 2 did 
show an increase in descriptive information, this increase was also contaminated with 
incorrect recall. Because of this, perhaps it is not surprising that law enforcement officials 
are hesitant to adopt such an interview procedure (e.g., Wells et al., 2006). In all, the 
findings of Experiment 2 are somewhat surprising given the nature of the available 
literature demonstrating the benefits of the ECI.  
 Perhaps the differences in the efficacy of the ECI between Experiments 1 and 2 
are due to the interviewers in Experiment 2. However, the interviewers in Experiment 2 
were trained in a manner similar to other published studies using the ECI. The author also 
monitored the interviews throughout the experimental process and the interviews were 
conducted in a manner similar to that of Experiment 1. Therefore, it is unlikely that this 
difference is the cause for the disparate results between Experiments 1 and 2.  Perhaps 
then it is the case that, because participants in Experiment 2 were all interviewed 
immediately, there was no opportunity for the benefit of the ECI to become noticeable. 
This benefit was noticeable after a 1-week delay in Experiment 1. 
 A future study could delay the initial interview for 1-week and delay the 
identification task an additional 1-week (2-weeks from the critical event). It may be that 
this procedure could allow for the benefit of the ECI to emerge with suspect 
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identifications. Fisher and Geiselman (1992) also point out that using multiple retrieval 
attempts is an important part of the ECI. In Experiment 2, the SI condition received the 
same number of retrieval attempts—albeit free recall attempts—as did participants in the 
ECI condition, they were just not accompanied by the presumed beneficial cognitive 
mnemonics. Perhaps then, simply using additional recall attempts in an immediate 
interview offers the same benefits as those offered with the ECI.  
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CHAPTER 5 – GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The results of Experiment 1 showed a significant advantage for the ECI with the 
focused imagery instruction. Experiment 2 failed to show the same advantage compared 
to a standard SI. The results of the current studies offer mixed support for the ECI as an 
optimal eyewitness interview technique. The ECI has been touted in the literature as a 
superior interview technique that allows eyewitnesses to engage several cognitive 
processes that they would not normally engage, in order to facilitate recall (e.g., Fisher & 
Schreiber, 2007; Kohnken et al., 1999). The results of these two studies offer conflicting 
evidence regarding the validity of this claim.  
 While Experiment 1 showed positive benefits for eyewitnesses interviewed with 
the ECI both immediately and at a delay, Experiment 2 failed to show the same benefits. 
In fact, it could be argued that the opposite was found. Experiment 2 showed an increase 
in incorrect recall rates that negatively impacted eyewitness accuracy rates. While this 
has been found in the literature before (e.g., Kohnken et al., 1999), it is not always the 
case (e.g., Fisher et al., 1987). While prior research reports mixed effects with regards to 
incorrect recall rates with the ECI, Experiment 2 in particular seems to have suffered 
from the negative effect of incorrect recall. More to the point, the incorrect recall rates 
with Experiment 2 seem to have erased any positive effect on accuracy that the ECI 
normally provides.  
 While the results varied across experiments, Experiment 1 provided a novel 
finding that focused imagery within the ECI framework is indeed beneficial. Further, this 
novel finding allows us to better understand the potential for the components of the ECI 
to interact in a way that facilitates memory. Fisher and Schreiber (2007) specifically 
	  52 
noted this to be one of the more important aspects of the ECI. In fact, examining the ECI 
in way to understand the interaction of the individual cognitive components with each 
other is one reason that they noted that the other attempts to validate the ECI have fallen 
short. As discussed earlier, previous attempts to validate the ECI have only examined 
individual components of the ECI in isolation (e.g., Boon & Noon, 1994; Milne & Bull, 
2002). In studies that have not isolated individual components, researchers have 
examined the ECI in such a way that any interactive effects were masked by the 
evaluation method (M. R. Davis et al., 2005). While the findings from these studies are 
mixed, Experiment 1 offers the first empirical evidence that at least the focused imagery 
component of the ECI combines with the other components in a way to facilitate 
eyewitness memory. 
 While the argument has been made that the mnemonic components of the ECI 
interact to facilitate memory (Fisher & Schreiber, 2007), this claim has not been 
empirically tested. Experiment 1 offers evidence to support this claim, at least with 
focused imagery. However, Experiment 2 failed to replicate this finding. Further, the lack 
of replication in Experiment 2 could be due to a negative interaction between the 
mnemonic components of the ECI. Pichert and Anderson (1977) and Anderson and 
Pichert (1978) found that the perspective-change instruction benefited additional recall of 
items related to the new perspective adopted. However, they failed to report any incorrect 
recall rates. It could be that the perspective-change instruction could induce some 
reconstructive processes, based on prior schemas, to become active leading to higher 
incorrect recall rates. If this is the case, then some components of the ECI, namely the 
perspective-change mnemonic, could negatively interact with the other components to 
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have a negative impact on overall eyewitness accuracy rates. Future research should 
examine this further. 
 These results are challenging from an applied perspective because they fail to 
show the previously reported robustness of the ECI. Because of this, caution must be 
taken when generalizing this interview technique to real world settings with eyewitnesses 
and victims. Experiment 1 showed that the ECI does have components that are beneficial 
to eyewitnesses by allowing them to engage more cognitive processes than would 
normally be engaged. As reported, Experiment 2 failed to replicate such findings. The 
results of the two Experiments presented here present a challenge to the state of the ECI 
literature and to the legal community at large. While it has been suggested that the ECI be 
adopted across the United States (Wells et al., 2000), the results from Experiment 2 failed 
to support such a suggestion.  
 One surprising finding was that WMC did not impact the recall performance of 
eyewitnesses in the current experiments. This is a novel and noteworthy finding because 
it shows that these techniques can be successfully applied to adults with a variety of 
WMCs. This could be another argument in support of the use of the ECI because it 
allows eyewitnesses to overcome any WMC limitations that they might face in standard 
police interviews. Research has shown that higher working memory capacity could help 
inoculate against eyewitnesses becoming susceptible to misinformation effects 
(Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002). However, it seems that WMC did not affect eyewitness 
recall in the current studies. It could also be argued that the participants in the current 
study had higher than average WMCs, but the mean performance in the CSPAN task 
does not indicate that this is the case, M = 36.57 and M = 35.40, in Experiment 1 and 2 
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respectively, out of a possible total score of 60. Given these results, it seems likely that 
the current interview techniques, both the ECI and the SI, may overcome any detrimental 
WMC effects.  
 The results of Experiment 2 failed to find any significant effects with eyewitness 
identification accuracy. As previously mentioned, these results were surprising. However, 
research has shown that an increase in suspect description errors can negatively impact 
eyewitness identification accuracy (Meissner et al. 2007). Given that there was an 
increase in the recall of incorrect person details in both the ECI and SI conditions of 
Experiment 2, this could likely be an explanation for the lack of an effect. However, there 
were no differences in suspect detail accuracy or incorrect recall across the interview 
conditions in Experiment 2. Therefore, this is likely not the case. Further, no such 
findings existed in Experiment 1. If participants had made eyewitness identifications in 
Experiment 1, then perhaps there would have been a different outcome. Future research 
with the ECI should not be limited simply to eyewitness recall and accuracy but should 
also focus on eyewitness identification accuracy, as this could be key to impacting future 
policy decisions with the ECI. 
 Future work with the ECI should also focus on designing experiments to continue 
to systematically examine the ECI in a way that will continue to shed light on the 
cognitive processes underlying this technique. Specific examination of the perspective-
change mnemonic is a prime candidate for such an examination. Given the findings of 
Pichert and Anderson (1977) described earlier, it could be that the perspective-change 
causes participants to induce schema consistent information that could lead to 
reconstructive processes becoming active. If this is the case, then indeed the perspective-
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change is negatively interacting with the other components of the ECI to wash away its 
beneficial effects. Experiment 1 has offered a way to test these assertions by simply 
removing the perspective-change component of the ECI and comparing it to the full ECI. 
A future experiment should examine this. Another future study could examine the impact 
that using a focused imagery instruction without a verbal description has on eyewitness 
accuracy at a delay, following an initial interview. This may allow for a release from 
verbal overshadowing. The results from Experiment 1 suggest that visual details of 
person information may still remain in memory after a week’s delay. 
 Given the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, a future study should examine the use 
of focused imagery with the SI to see if there is a benefit in eyewitness accuracy. It could 
be that adding focused imagery to the SI may be as beneficial as the full ECI. An 
additional study should also examine the use of focused imagery and context 
reinstatement immediately before lineup identifications. This could allow eyewitnesses to 
access visual information without accessing their verbal descriptions, which could 
improve identification accuracy. 
In a similar manner as is discussed above, Experiment 1 showed that the focused 
imagery component of the ECI positively benefits the ECI when combined with the other 
ECI components. Future research should continue to examine the various aspects of the 
ECI to determine which aspects are beneficial and which are not. The methodology used 
in Experiment 1 also allows for a better understanding of the cognitive processes that are 
underlying the ECI. This is of particular importance from a policy perspective because it 
will allow us to better understand how memory is affected with the ECI. Being able to 
understand this is key to affecting policy decisions about the adoption of this technique. 
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Policy decisions should not be made based on the fact that the ECI seems to work (cf. 
Malpass et al., 2008), they should be based on the fact that we know why and how the 
ECI works and under what circumstances.  
 In conclusion the results from the current studies provide a great deal of insight 
into the challenges of interviewing eyewitnesses and the complexity of the circumstances 
that real interviewers face. These results also show that much more work needs to be 
done to further validate—or invalidate—the ECI as an optimal interview technique. The 
novel approach used in Experiment 1 should be adopted to systematically understand the 
interactive effect that each of the cognitive mnemonics has in regards to their 
contribution to the ECI, both from a practical and theoretical perspective. These results 
also provide clear evidence that the ECI should not be adopted without such further 
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Experiment 1 Demographics 
 
Race N Ethinicity N Gender N 
Age 
Range N 
White 56 Hispanic 4 Male 17 Min 18 
Black 6 
Non-
Hispanic 67 Female 54 Max 24 
Middle Eastern 1       
Asian 3       
American 
Indian 2       
No Response 3       




Mean Recall Rates by Item Type from Experiment 1 
 
Item Type N M SE 
Correct    
  Action 71 17.39 1.08 
  Context 71 12.72 0.79 
  Person 71 9.30 0.58 
Incorrect    
  Action 71 0.52 0.11 
  Context 71 1.21 0.15 
  Person 71 3.24 0.26 
Confabulations   
  Action 71 0.34 0.08 
  Context 71 0.90 0.17 











Experiment 2 Demographics 
 
 
Race N Ethnicity N Gender N Age Range N 
White 37 Hispanic 7 Male 12 Min 18 
Black 8 Non-Hispanic 53 Female 49 Max 27 
Middle Eastern 3 No Response 1     
Asian 2       
American 
Indian 5       
Native Islander 1       









Items N M SE 
Action 15 61    
    Correct   6.94 0.32 
    Incorrect   0.23 0.07 
    Confabulation   0.13 0.04 
Context 18 61    
    Correct   6.15 0.42 
    Incorrect   1.15 0.15 
    Confabulation   0.26 0.09 
Conversation 7 61    
    Correct   3.84 0.13 
    Incorrect   0.23 0.07 
    Confabulation   0.05 0.04 
Person 23 61    
    Correct   9.18 0.51 
    Incorrect   2.02 0.22 





















































 FIGURE 4.1 
 




























































Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Rates Based on Choosing Propensity from 
Experiment 2 
 
 
